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The parties’ supplemental briefing confirms that all of the Counties’ claims against the 
Challenged Laws are unripe.  In their supplemental brief, the Counties concede they have alleged 
only facial challenges.  And, at the same time, the Counties emphasize they are not relying on 
“lost revenue from undervalued airline assessments . . . as the basis for either past or imminent 
injury to the County.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 13).  Thus, the Counties are not relying on the 
very thing they must rely on to demonstrate their facial challenges are ripe.1  Accordingly, the 
Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Counties’ challenges on ripeness 
grounds.   
ARGUMENT 
I. The Counties did not properly allege as-applied challenges. 
In the first question in its Supplemental Briefing Order, the Court asks whether the 
Counties properly alleged any as-applied challenges.  (Supp. Order at 3).  Based on the parties’ 
responses, it is undisputed the Counties did not.  The Counties dispel any remaining doubts by 
expressly providing a “reluctant concession to a ‘facial’ or a ‘quasi facial’ classification of their 
claims” and then reiterating the “Counties bring facial challenges” only.  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. 
at 7).   
Having made this concession, the Counties do not attempt to show there is a factual basis 
for any as-applied challenges.  To the contrary, the Counties contend their facial challenges “are 
pure questions of law that need no express application to be rendered void.”  (Id. at 11).  Thus, 
 
1 Salt Lake Cty. v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996) (holding a county “must produce a 
tax assessment that has been challenged and reduced under [the challenged provision] with a 
resulting loss of revenue to the relevant county.”). 
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the Court should characterize the Counties’ claims “only as facial challenges, not as-applied 
challenges based on a particular aspect of the 2017 tax assessment.”  (Supp. Order at 2).   
The Counties’ “reluctan[ce]” to concede they have alleged only facial challenges 
apparently arises from their concerns over the burden associated with such challenges:  in the 
same paragraph as their concession, and the two paragraphs that follow, the Counties argue (for 
the first time on appeal) they do not have the burden to show there are no set of circumstances 
under which the Challenged Laws would be valid.  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 7-9).   
But the Counties’ arguments about the applicable burden for their facial challenges are 
irrelevant to the issue of ripeness.2  That is, before the Court determines and applies the 
appropriate burden for a constitutional challenge to a statute, the plaintiff must first demonstrate 
the challenge is ripe.  And demonstrating the challenge is ripe depends on whether the plaintiff 
suffered an injury, not on the particular burden the challenger must satisfy.  Cf. Gillmor v. 
Summit Cty., 2010 UT 69, ¶¶ 27-28, 246 P.3d 102 (noting that although as applied and facial 
challenges involve different tests, both types of challenges accrue and ripen on the “the date 
upon which the plaintiff’s injury occurred.”). 
Thus, to determine whether the Counties’ facial challenges are ripe, the Court need not 
address their argument that the “no set of circumstances” standard does not apply to the 
challenges.   
II. The Counties fail to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate harm and ripeness. 
The Court’s second question asks whether facts alleged about the 2017 tax assessment 
establish the Counties have been harmed by the Challenged Laws and, if not, whether the 
 
2 Besides, the Court did not ask for briefing on the burden in the Supplemental Briefing Order. 
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complaint contains another factual basis to support a ripeness determination.  (Supp. Order at 3-
4).  The answer to both parts of this question is “no.”  
The Counties make clear they are not relying on the 2017 assessment to establish harm or 
ripeness.  Although the Counties observe that they alleged that airline property valuations were 
reduced “an average of 39%” with a “total loss in airline tax revenues of roughly $5 million” in 
2017, they emphasize that “it is not lost revenue from undervalued airline assessments that 
serves as the basis for either past or imminent injury to the County.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 
13). 
Thus, for purposes of demonstrating ripeness, the Counties emphatically deny they are 
relying on a tax assessment that has been reduced under the Challenged Laws with a resulting 
loss of revenue to the Counties.  But, as this Court observed, that is exactly what they must rely 
on to demonstrate their challenges are ripe for adjudication.  (Supp. Order at 1 (citing Bangerter, 
928 P.2d at 385). 
Instead, the Counties contend the “injury or unconstitutional impact caused by the 
Challenged Laws is the fact the laws prevent the accurate fair market assessment of airline 
property to its full value in every case.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 14).  But the Court has already 
rejected this very type of alleged “injury” as too abstract and hypothetical to demonstrate 
ripeness.  Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 385 (dismissing as unripe Counties’ abstract claim that the 
Equalization Act violated constitutional provision requiring that “property be assessed at its fair 
market value” and would “diminish tax revenues and impact county budgets” because the 
Counties “failed to set forth specific facts of any case that has arisen.”).  “If the Counties wish to 
attack the [Challenged Laws] in the abstract without a specific controversy which is ripe for 
adjudication, they must approach the legislature, not this [C]ourt.”  Id. at 386. 
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Thus, the Counties have not demonstrated any of their challenges are ripe.   
III. The Court should not decide the Counties’ purely legal questions because they 
are not connected to a concrete set of facts. 
The Court’s third question asks if it would be proper for the Court to decide the Counties’ 
“pure[] legal questions” in the event it finds that the Counties’ claims are not connected to a 
concrete set of facts.  (Supp. Order at 4).  The Counties assert it would proper to do so.  
(Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 11 (“The Counties raise facial challenges to the statutes’ 
constitutionality, which when viewed in light of the compulsory nature of the Challenged 
Statutes are pure questions of law that need no express application to be rendered void.”)).  The 
Counties are mistaken. 
Attempting to support their position, the Counties assert the Court “assumes too much” 
by interpreting Bangerter to require, in all cases involving constitutional challenges to tax laws, 
the County produce a reduced tax assessment in order to provide a concrete set of facts necessary 
to demonstrate ripeness.  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 10-11 (citing Supp. Order at 1-3)).  According 
to the Counties, in interpreting Bangerter, the Court makes the “obvious assumption” that 
“administrative factual findings arising from a ‘reduced assessment’ reflecting revenue loss are 
always material or relevant to the constitutional determination of a statute’s validity measured 
against controlling constitutional provisions.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 11).  This assumption, 
they say, is incorrect.  (Id). 
But the Court did not make this assumption in either Bangerter or the Supplemental 
Briefing Order.  As stated in Bangerter and reiterated in the Supplemental Briefing Order, a 
County challenging the constitutionality of a tax law must produce a specific reduced assessment 
to demonstrate it suffered a concrete injury sufficient to make its challenge ripe, 928 P.2d at 385, 
not because the Court assumed the reduced assessment would be relevant to determining whether 
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the challenged law is facially constitutional.  In other words, a claim’s justiciability is different 
from the statute’s constitutionality. 
The Counties also target another non-existent assumption.  That is, the Counties argue the 
“Court’s apparent preference for an administratively adjudicated assessment that evidences 
revenue loss assumes the Counties are always afforded an opportunity to challenge the reduced 
airline assessment in the first instance.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 12 (emphasis added)).  The 
Counties then argue this assumption is incorrect with respect to the Threshold Law because it 
denies taxing entities the ability to appeal certain valuations.  (Id.)   
These arguments are inaccurate and inapposite.  For purposes of determining the ripeness 
of facial constitutional challenges, the Court has not indicated it prefers an administratively 
adjudicated assessment or that it assumes there is an opportunity to administratively challenge an 
assessment.  And, consistent with Bangerter, the district court correctly determined the Counties’ 
challenge to the Threshold Law is unripe because their complaint does not contain allegations 
showing it was applied to an assessment or prevented the Counties from appealing an 
assessment.  (R. 912).   
In a further attempt to avoid the ripeness principles in Bangerter, the Counties rely on an 
earlier case from 1959 where, according to the Counties, “this Court accepted original 
jurisdiction to review the statutes’ facial conformity with the Utah Constitution without the 
production of a specific tax assessment.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 11) (citing Moon Lake 
Electric Ass’n, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 345 P.2d 612 (Utah 1959)).  But, unlike 
Bangerter, this Court did not address the issue of ripeness in Moon Lake.  And it did not hold 
that a court could adjudicate a constitutional challenge to a tax law without a specific tax 
assessment.  Thus, Moon Lake is inapposite and Bangerter is controlling. 
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Finally, the Counties erroneously apply the pleading requirements for standing to 
ripeness.  This error begins with the Counties seizing upon a statement in the Supplemental 
Briefing Order where the Court states a party must generally “allege sufficient facts in their 
complaint to show that the challenged statutes have been applied to them, or will soon be applied 
to them, before they have standing to bring either a facial or an as-applied challenge to the 
statute.  Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).”  (Appellants’ Supp. Brief at 15 
(quoting Supp. Order at 4) (emphasis added)).  But the Court’s statement expressly refers to 
“standing,” not ripeness.  And, in Bangerter, the Court distinguished standing from ripeness.  
Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 386 (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 
1985), and Utah Association of Counties v. Tax Commission, 895 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995)) (stating 
that cases illustrating “standing in tax-assessment-based actions” are “inapposite, first, because 
the issue in the instant case is not standing but ripeness, second, because [these cases] involved 
actual challenges to specific property value assessments”). 
Overlooking the distinction between standing and ripeness, the Counties then improperly 
apply the Court’s statement about standing to the question of ripeness.  First, the Counties 
incorrectly assert there is “no dispute the Challenged Laws apply to and have been applied by the 
Commission to the assessment of airline property.”3  (Appellants’ Supp. Brief at 15-16) (citing 
Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 6, 10, 11, 36-41, 58, 59, 74, 77-92, 94-100, 112-114, 120-122, 125).  And then 
 
3 This assertion is incorrect.  The district court correctly found the “Complaint does not contain 
any allegations regarding the application of the Review Threshold Law.”  (R. 912).  The 
Complaint also does not contain any allegations about the application of the Allocation Law to 
an assessment.  (State Supp. Br. at 8-9).  And, although the Complaint does include allegations 
about how the Valuation Law affected them collectively, these allegations do not satisfy 
Bangerter’s ripeness standard, (id. at 9), and, besides, the Counties have made clear they are not 
attempting to demonstrate past or imminent injury based on a loss of revenue caused by applying 
the Valuation Law and other Challenged Laws to an assessment.  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 13). 
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the Counties abruptly conclude “[n]othing more need be alleged.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Brief at 
16).     
But Bangerter requires more to demonstrate ripeness.  Specifically, Bangerter requires 
that “concrete facts be pleaded indicating a[] specific injury” (loss of revenue) caused by the 
application of the challenged law to a particular assessment.  928 P.2d at 385 (stating that 
plaintiff must plead concrete facts showing the plaintiff suffered an injury to “render the 
constitutionality of [a tax law] ripe for adjudication.”).  And the Counties have failed to do so.   
IV. The Counties do not address the Court’s fourth question. 
The Court’s fourth question asks whether “any of the Counties' claims in this case arise 
from facts stemming from a tax assessment that is not being challenged, or has not already been 
challenged, in another case.”  (Supp. Order at 4).  The Counties did not answer this question.  
But the State and Airlines did answer this question and generally agree that the pendency of 
challenges to the Challenged Laws in other cases further justifies dismissing this lawsuit.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 Thus, the Counties’ complaint should be dismissed in its entirety on ripeness grounds.  
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